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Over the last thirty years, research in both law and political 
science has adhered to a dominant discourse that looks like a 
coherent set of notions about European constitutionalism and the role 
of law in fostering the momentum for further European integration.1 
Emblematic of this traditional view are Eric Stein, Joseph Weiler, 
 
 *  Associate Professor, SIS Policy Scholar and Jean Monnet Chair Ad 
Personam, American University. 
 1. See Loïc Azoulai & Renaud Dehousse, The European Court of Justice and 
the Legal Dynamics of Integration, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE EUROPEAN 
UNION 350, 350–64 (Erik Jones et al. eds., 2012); J.H.H. WEILER, THE 
CONSTITUTION OF EUROPE: “DO THE NEW CLOTHES HAVE AN EMPEROR?” AND 
OTHER ESSAYS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION (1999); Joseph Weiler, The 
Community System: the Dual Character of Supranationalism, in THE YEARBOOK 
OF EUROPEAN LAW I 1981 267 (F.G. Jacobs ed., 1982); see also R. Daniel 
Kelemen & Susan K. Schmidt, Introduction – The European Court of Justice and 
Legal Integration: Perpetual Momentum?, 19 J. EUR. POL’Y 1, 2–5 (2012) (noting 
that the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) has played an indispensible role as a 
motor of European integration resulting in “pro-integration preferences”); cf. 
Morten Rasmussen, Establishing a Constitutional Practice of European Law: The 
History of Legal Service of the European Executive, 1952–65, 21 CONTEMP. EUR. 
HIST. 375, 376–83 (2012) [hereinafter Rasmussen, Establishing a Constitutional 
Practice] (noting the very existence of the Court was debated in treaty negotiations 
and depended on the cooperation of national courts to function). 
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Renaud Dehousse, and Pierre Pescatore, whose work on legal 
integration has shaped the field of EU studies.2 At the core of this 
research is the question: How do we account for the expansion of 
judicial power in the European Union? Much of this research 
describes a constitutional narrative where legal decisions set the 
European integration process on a clear trajectory, in which it shifted 
from being an intergovernmental organization, transforming itself 
into a federal system, and subsequently advocating for a more 
democratic constitutional union. The so-called “judicial 
empowerment” thesis provided the dominant theoretical and 
empirical explanation for why the European Court of Justice through 
its legal doctrines reconstituted the jurisdictional foundation of the 
legal regime in Europe by expanding judicial power of courts at both 
the national and European level through joint allocation of legal 
authority to both levels.3 Through the seminal rulings, Van Gend en 
Loos and Costa v. ENEL in 1963 and 1964 respectively, the Court 
established direct effect and supremacy as core principles on which 
to build the subsequent case law over the next five decades.4 
National courts acquiesced to this constitutional practice, referring 
thousands of cases to the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) for 
preliminary rulings concerning a wide range of socio-economic 
disputes. This well-known legal analysis describes an evolutionary 
development that seems natural and inevitable as the subsequent 
rationale for deepening integration through law rests on a functional 
premise, framed in terms of efficiency gains, in which the extension 
of the market, promotion of economic freedoms, and rise of 
 
 2. RENAUD DEHOUSSE, THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: THE POLITICS OF 
JUDICIAL INTEGRATION 71 (1998); Eric Stein, Lawyers, Judges, and the Making of 
a Transnational Constitution, 75 AM. J. INT’L L. 1 (1981); J.H.H. Weiler, The 
Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2406 (1991); PIERRE PESCATORE, 
THE LAW OF INTEGRATION: EMERGENCE OF A NEW PHENOMENON IN 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, BASED ON THE EXPERIENCE OF THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITIES 44–52 (1974). 
 3. Weiler, supra note 2. 
 4. See, e.g., Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585, 587 (“A Member 
State’s obligation under the EEC Treaty . . . is legally complete and consequently 
capable of producing direct effects on the relations between Member States and 
individuals.”); Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der 
Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1, 8 (holding that Article 12 of the EEC Treaty 
“produces direct effects and creates individual rights which national courts must 
protect”). 
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regulatory agencies require legal doctrines that provide solutions to 
the growing complexity of “shared rule.”5 
However, the contraction of the European economy due to the 
sovereign debt crisis has raised concerns about both the effectiveness 
of the European Union and its constituent Member States and the 
institutional and administrative capacity of the political system to 
deal with the crisis. In the current context, European 
constitutionalism has become seemingly disengaged from the major 
debates about growth, prosperity, and competitiveness. While for 
some the locus of power has shifted away from Member States to 
central banks or international financial institutions, in terms of 
promoting macro-economic stability, the jural state is as central to 
the history of European economic integration as it is central to the 
history of American political development.6  
In contemporary European history, courts also operate in the 
context of social and economic change and political volatility. The 
economic recession and ensuing euro crisis in Europe has generated 
pressure on domestic wages and prices through cuts to public 
spending aimed at reducing a state’s debts and deficits and increasing 
the overall economic competitiveness and investment climate. 
However, judicial intervention has played a critical role in reviewing 
the bailouts, the so-called fiscal compact and its constitutionality, in 
several Member States. In Germany, petitions challenged the lack of 
parliamentary involvement in the passage of the “bailout” treaties. 
The German Constitutional Court ruled that the resulting European 
stabilization mechanism conforms to German budgetary 
 
 5. See generally DAVID MCKAY, DESIGNING EUROPE: COMPARATIVE 
LESSONS FROM THE FEDERAL EXPERIENCE (2001); THE FEDERAL VISION: 
LEGITIMACY AND LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE 
EUROPEAN UNION (Kalypso Nicolaidis & Robert Howse eds., 2001) [hereinafter 
THE FEDERAL VISION] 
 6. See generally MICHELLE P. EGAN, CONSTRUCTING A EUROPEAN MARKET: 
STANDARDS, REGULATION, AND GOVERNANCE (2001) [hereinafter EGAN, 
CONSTRUCTING A EUROPEAN MARKET] (outlining the importance of the “jural 
state” to integration); MICHELLE P. EGAN, SINGLE MARKETS: ECONOMIC 
INTEGRATION IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES (forthcoming) [hereinafter 
EGAN, SINGLE MARKETS]. The term “jural state” is taken from William J. Novak, 
The Legal Origins of the Modern American State, in LOOKING BACK AT LAW’S 
CENTURY 249, 252 (Austin Sarat et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter Novak, The Legal 
Origins of the Modern American State]. The work of William Novak and Howard 
Gillman has been influential in terms of shaping arguments in this essay. 
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sovereignty.7 By comparison, the Portuguese Constitutional Court 
ruled that specific austerity measures passed by the legislature 
breached the Constitution, as they discriminated between public and 
private workers.8 Courts at the national level can therefore provide a 
level of uncertainty to European Union efforts to address the 
eurozone debt crisis. At the same time, the current protectionist 
pressures and renationalization of economic policies face similar 
scrutiny from the ECJ to ensure that economic freedoms and 
competitive market practices are not undermined.9 In this sense, the 
courts play a continuing role in addressing the functional deficiencies 
of a common currency framework as well as fostering and 
maintaining a single market. The scope and interpretation of 
European law is central to the functioning of the European economy; 
furthermore, the federal preemption of state laws and regulations to 
create that integrated economy has generated new issues for both 
state and federal courts seeking to balance both public power and 
private rights.10 The ECJ has derived its authority from multiple 
constitutional sources—both national and international—in 
expanding its legal framework and jurisprudence.11 Even then, the 
 
 7. See, e.g., Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional 
Court] July 10, 2012, [BVerwGE] 17–19, (Ger.) (discussing the implications of 
global market stabilization on German budgetary sovereignty); see also Kenneth 
A. Armstrong, Pringle Has His Chips, EUTOPIA LAW, eutopialaw.com/2012/11/ 
27/pringle-has-his-chips/ (Nov. 27, 2012) (explaining the Court’s stance that any 
unilateral state action must be consistent and compatible with obligations under 
EU law, specifically in the context of the validity of the European Council 
Decision and the “alleged incompatibility between the ESM Treaty and EU law”). 
 8. See Acórdão do Tribunal Constitucional n.º 187/2013, Diário da República, 
1.ª série — N.º 78 — 22 de abril de 2013, available at http://dre.pt/pdf1sdip/2013/ 
04/07800/0232802423.pdf. 
 9. See Hugo Brady, The Politics of European Justice, CTR. EUR. REFORM 
(June 1, 2011), www.cer.org.uk/publications/archive/bulletin-article/2011/politics-
european-justice (considering the ECJ’s move into “areas that affect national 
sovereignty and personal freedoms” to be “controversial”). 
 10. See generally MIGUEL POIARES MADURO, WE THE COURT: THE EUROPEAN 
COURT OF JUSTICE AND THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC CONSTITUTION: A CRITICAL 
READING OF ARTICLE 30 OF THE EC TREATY (1998) [hereinafter MADURO, WE THE 
COURT] (discussing how the balance of power between the Member States and the 
Union, and between public power and the market, has created powerful 
constitutional dilemmas in promoting market integration). 
 11. See J.H.H. Weiler & Nicolas J.S. Lockhart, Taking Rights Seriously: The 
European Court and its Fundamental Rights Jurisprudence Part I, 32 COMMON 
MKT. L. REV. 51, 52–53 (1995) [hereinafter Weiler & Lockhart, Taking Rights 
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acceptance of European law has not been unconditional, for it has 
been resisted by national constitutional courts.12 Some scholars argue 
that Member States have, in some instances, challenged this 
incursion upon domestically entrenched rights and legislative statutes 
and their refusal to accept the primacy of European law reflects a 
long-held concern about rights protection within the Community 
framework.13 Others see the European legal order as based on 
competing claims of authority, with the resulting legal pluralism 
leading to a system where constitutional claims are continuously 
accommodated given the multiplicity of constitutional jurisdictions.14  
Few dispute the central role of the Court in the integration process. 
As state actors failed to slow down the surge of trade barriers and 
protectionism, the Court was consequential in shaping markets and 
fostering agreement on common policies in the early decades. Not 
only did the Court generate innovative rules and norms—such as 
 
Seriously] (suggesting that protection of human rights serves as a grounds for 
jurisdiction); see also Miguel Poiares Maduro, Interpreting European Law: 
Judicial Adjudication in a Context of Constitutional Pluralism, 1 EUR. J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1, 14 [hereinafter Maduro, Interpreting European Law] (noting as an 
example that “the authority which the Court itself recognizes to its previous 
decisions is a consequence of the need to guarantee the values of coherence, 
uniformity and legal certainty inherent to any legal system”). 
 12. See generally KAREN J. ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF 
EUROPEAN LAW: THE MAKING OF AN INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW IN EUROPE 
60–71 (2001) [hereinafter ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN 
LAW]; BILL DAVIES, RESISTING THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: WEST 
GERMANY’S CONFRONTATION WITH EUROPEAN LAW, 1949-1979 7–19 (2012). 
 13. THE EUROPEAN COURT AND NATIONAL COURTS—DOCTRINE AND 
JURISPRUDENCE: LEGAL CHANGE IN ITS SOCIAL CONTEXT (Anne-Marie Slaughter 
et al. eds., 1998); see Verwaltungsgericht [VG] [Administrative Trial Courts] Dec. 
17, 1970, [BVerwGE] (Ger.) (“Although Community regulations are not German 
national laws, but legal rules pertaining to the community, they must respect the 
elementary, fundamental rights guaranteed by the German Constitution and the 
essential structural principles of national law.”); KAREN J. ALTER, THE EUROPEAN 
COURT’S POLITICAL POWER: SELECTED ESSAYS (2009). 
 14. See J.H.H. Weiler, Federalism Without Constitutionalism: Europe’s 
Sonderweg, in THE FEDERAL VISION, supra note 5, at 55, 58–59; see also Daniel 
Halberstam, Pluralism in Marbury and Van Gend, THE PAST AND FUTURE OF EU 
LAW: THE CLASSICS OF EU LAW REVISITED ON THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE 
ROME TREATY 30–32 (Miguel Poiares Maduro & Loïc Azoulai eds., 2010) 
(comparing pluralism in the United States and Europe by juxtaposing limits on the 
Supreme Court’s power of judicial review with the scope of supremacy and 
Community law over national law and the scope of rights that European law 
affords individuals within Member States). 
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mutual recognition—to foster market integration by accepting 
regulatory equivalence among states, the courts have been charged 
with monitoring and enforcing market regulations to ensure 
compliance.15 Legal historians have fostered a lively debate about the 
reliability and accuracy of these dominant interpretations that have 
emerged to explain the constitutional foundations of the European 
Community.16 While there were initial concerns about a gouvernment 
de juges, resulting in conditional controls over the European Court,17 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the Court kept its focus on 
procedural questions. While the ECJ was designed to establish 
regularity in court procedure, it did not take a proactive role 
addressing treaty violations or pushing the common market 
forward.18 Initially, the ECJ drew upon the terms outlined in the 
Treaty of Rome and Treaty of Paris to create a court that could a) 
establish a standard interpretation of EU laws; b) annul legal 
proceedings contrary to Community goals; c) assess breaches of 
Community obligations; d) penalize European institutions for failure 
to act; and e) provide advisory opinions.19 However, the Court has 
sought to use the conferred powers through the preliminary rulings 
mechanism in which domestic courts could seek an interpretation of 
the application of European law in the domestic context (article 267 
TFEU) into a more systematic mechanism for promoting the uniform 
application of EU law.20 
While some of this earlier scholarship generated a seminal 
 
 15. EGAN, SINGLE MARKETS, supra note 6. 
 16. Antoine Vauchez, ‘Integration-through-Law’ Contribution to a Socio-
history of EU Political Commonsense 2–3 (European Univ. Inst. Robert Schuman 
Ctr. for Advanced Studies, EUI Working Papers RSCAS 2008/10, 2010), available 
at www.eui.eu/RSCAS/WP-Texts/08_10.pdf; see also Rasmussen, Establishing a 
Constitutional Practice, supra note 1, at 378. 
 17. ROBERT LECOURT, L’EUROPE DES JUGES (1976); Morten Rasmussen, 
Exploring the Secret History of the Legal Service of the European Executives, 
1952-1967 10 (EUSA Conference, Mar. 2011), available at http://euce.org/eusa/ 
2011/papers/5d_rasmussen.pdf. 
 18. See Karen J. Alter, The Global Spread of European Style International 
Courts, 35 W. EUR. POL. 135, 140 (2012) [hereinafter Alter, The Global Spread]. 
 19. See Azoulai & Dehousse, supra note 1, at 357–59; Anne Boerger-de 
Smedt, La Court de Justice dans les Négociations du Traité de Paris Institutant la 
CECA 1 (2011), available at euce.org/eusa/2011/papers/5d_boerger.pdf. 
 20. Note that the United States Supreme Court requires an actual case or 
controversy to grant certiorari and does not provide an advisory review function. 
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“integration through law project,”21 proponents of a new legal history 
have called for a more finely grained analysis of the historical 
evolution of European law, and in doing so, call on us to reconsider 
the canonical histories that have triggered a more normative 
approach in which there has been a shift from legal reasoning and 
analysis to broader questions about the role of courts in a democratic 
society.22 Some critics perceive this teleological interpretation as 
judicial activism,23 since the shift from interpretation of the legal 
rules to a broader “constitutional telos” implies a different 
conception of courts than those that rely on text such as 
constructivism or originalism24 Other critics perceive the 
constitutional asymmetry inherent in EU treaties and case law as 
undermining the social model in the face of market integration.25 In 
 
 21. See generally Mauro Cappelletti, Integration Through Law: Europe and the 
American Federal Experience—A General Introduction, in INTEGRATION 
THROUGH LAW: EUROPE AND THE AMERICAN FEDERAL EXPERIENCE 3 (Vol. 1: 
Methods, Tools, and Institutions, Book 1: A Political, Legal, and Economic 
Overview) (1986). 
 22. Compare id. (emphasizing the early view that the role of law was crucial to 
effective integration), with Robert A. Dahl, Decision Making in a Democracy: The 
Supreme Court as a National Policy‐Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 281–83 (1957) 
(drawing on his seminal arguments in the Preface to Democratic Theory in relation 
to the role of courts in a democratic society as not simply institutions to protect 
minority rights against majority tyranny, but frequently called upon to select 
among alternative policies in which there is contestation and disagreement, so that 
the court must “choose among controversial alternatives of public policy by 
appealing to at least some criteria of acceptability on questions of fact and value 
that cannot be found in or deduced from precedent, statute, and Constitution”). See 
Giandomenico Majone, Europe’s Democratic Deficit: The Question of Standards, 
4 EUR. L.J. 5, 11 (1998) for a similar application about non-majoritarian 
institutions in the EU context. 
 23. See HJALTE RASMUSSEN, ON LAW AND POLICY IN THE EUROPEAN COURT 
OF JUSTICE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY IN JUDICIAL POLICYMAKING 377 (1986). 
 24. Maduro, Interpreting European Law, supra note 11, at 7–8. See generally 
ANTONIN SCALIA, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 3 (Amy 
Cutmann ed., 1997) (arguing that an originalist perspective is appropriate when 
interpreting the United States Constitution). 
 25. See Jonathon W. Moses, Is Constitutional Symmetry Enough? Social 
Models and Markey Integration in the US and Europe, 49 J. COM. MKT. STUD. 
823, 824–26 (2011); see also Michelle Egan, Single Market, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 1, at 410–11 (“[T]he economic 
constitution of the EU not only promotes cross-border liberalization, contingent on 
specific judicial exemptions, but also provides for the possibility of addressing 
market failure through the establishment of rules in the common interest.”); Fritz 
W. Scharpf, The European Social Model: Coping with the Challenges of Diversity, 
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this view, national welfare and employment policies are subject to 
scrutiny and may be incompatible with economic integration.26 For 
Giandomenico Majone, the European Union cannot pursue the same 
type of distributional politics that characterize national welfare states 
due to its lack of legitimacy and efficiency.27 By contrast, advocates 
perceive the expansion of EU social rights, addressing the rights of 
individuals, not only in terms of “market citizenship” through 
employment rights, working conditions, and pay equity, but also 
through new social rights for third country nationals through family 
reunification, social protection, and assistance schemes,28 as critical 
for socio-economic legitimacy.29  
II. NEW APPROACHES TO EU LAW  
Are such approaches correct and desirable in understanding the 
development of the European legal order? In his analysis, Hjalte 
Rasmussen argues that scholars have not looked critically enough at 
the “constitutional” paradigm and its subsequent adoption almost 
wholesale into academic, political, and judicial circles.30 It has 
become the dominant narrative that few scholars challenge the 
transformation of the treaties into a constitutional polity. Regardless 
 
40 J. COM. MKT. STUD. 645, 649–50 (2002). 
 26. Scharpf, supra note 25, at 645. See generally Case C-346/06, Rüffert v 
Niedersachsen, 2008 E.C.R. I-01989, 01994; Case C-438/05, Int’l Transp. 
Workers’ Fed’n et al. v. Viking Line ABP et al., 2007 E.C.R. I-10806, 10835; Case 
C-341/05, Luval un Patneri v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet et al., 2007 
E.C.R. I-11845, 11888. These cases focus on the relationship between market 
freedoms and fundamental social rights, with a particular focus on the freedom of 
association, the right to collective bargaining, and the right to strike. 
 27. Majone, supra note 22, at 15 (explaining that the development of welfare 
policies at the European level would actually aggravate the legitimacy problem). 
 28. See Lisa Conant, When Courts Decide: Foreigners’ Rights and Social 
Citizenship in Europe and the US, 7 EUR. POL. SCI. 43, 44–45 (2008) (comparing 
Europe to the United States in a discussion of new social rights recognized in 
European courts). 
 29. See MARIO MONTI, A NEW STRATEGY FOR THE SINGLE MARKET: AT THE 
SERVICE OF EUROPE’S ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 23–24, 71 (2010), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/bepa/pdf/monti_report_final_10_05_2010_en.pdf (observing a 
certain “integration fatigue” as well as a “market fatigue,” suggesting there is a 
need to restore a much-needed legitimacy to the single market to promote both 
economic growth and social rights). 
 30. See Rasmussen, Establishing a Constitutional Practice, supra note 1, at 
381. 
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of whether this emerged from instrumental, conscious judicial 
actions on the part of legal activists or through incremental, cautious 
expansion of legal competences through the doctrines of direct 
effect, supremacy, and the liberalized criteria for standing to sue, the 
European Court has paralleled many of the moves made by federal 
constitutional courts. 
In recent years, new archival work by legal historians has 
emphasized the importance of the historical and institutional context 
for understanding the evolution of EU integration, as one that 
involves a multitude of actors—from lawyers and judges to elected 
officials—who were pursuing independent and often strategic goals 
coalescing around an agenda that enabled court-centered activism.31 
First, this was a period when the legal community was expanding its 
own professional identity. Lawyers became key advocates in the 
debates, and successfully mobilized a transnational network of jurists 
through the legal service and national federations of European law.32 
Second, elected officials provided the opportunity to expand the 
venue for legal jurisdiction by including provisions for amending 
constitutions to allow for the prospect of a supranational legal 
framework, that has subsequently expanded the options for litigation, 
and providing for remedies, including sanctions and financial 
penalties, to enlarge the ambit of judicial power. Third, the scope of 
litigation interacted with the opportunities provided by other 
institutions. Litigation rates were not high initially, arguably due to 
the predominance of politically driven integration through strategies 
of harmonization and approximation.33 Once recalcitrant States 
blocked further political integration, fearing threats to state 
hegemony, the strategic game shifted to the legal arena. A 
constitutional entrenchment of rights through the supremacy and 
 
 31. See Morten Rasmussen, Constructing and Deconstructing ‘Constitutional’ 
European Law: Some Reflections on how to Study the History of European Law 2–
3, 12 (EUSA Conference, 2011) [hereinafter Rasmussen, Constructing and 
Deconstructing], available at euce.org/eusa/2011/papers/6a_rasmussen.pdf. See 
generally TRANSNATIONAL NETWORKS IN REGIONAL INTEGRATION: GOVERNING 
EUROPE 1945–83 (Wolfram Kaiser et al. eds., 2010). 
 32. Rasmussen, Constructing and Deconstructing, supra note 31, at 15. See 
generally ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW, supra note 
12; Karen Alter, Jurist Social Movements in Europe, 20 EUSA REV. (Fall 2007), 
available at http://www.eustudies.org/publications_review_fall07.php. 
 33. EGAN, CONSTRUCTING A EUROPEAN MARKET, supra note 6, at 106. 
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direct-effect doctrines resulted in institutional empowerment to foster 
credible commitments, reduce decision-making costs, and prevent 
policy reversals.34  
These analyses over time opened up new lines of inquiry into the 
role of legal pluralism, in terms of how the role of preliminary 
rulings shape the incentives and constraints facing lower courts,35 the 
strategies of litigation and legal mobilization,36 and the diffusion of 
legal norms beyond the European context.37 Fascination with the 
origins of the constitutional paradigm has given way to more formal 
analysis looking at the relationship between the courts, the degree of 
autonomy or constraints imposed by state signaling,38 and more 
comparative work on constitutional review and administrative rule-
making, which provides a plurality of approaches from principal-
agent to deliberative democracy models.39 Though these models hold 
 
 34. See Howard Gillman, How Political Parties Can Use the Courts to 
Advance Their Agendas: Federal Courts in the US, 1875-1891, 96 AMER. POL. 
SCI. REV. 511, 511 (2002) (“Studies have attributed institutional empowerment to a 
variety of political motivations including a desire to protect . . . favored policies 
against reversal.”); Alec Stone Sweet, Constitutional Courts, in THE OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 818–820 (Michel Rosenfeld 
& András Sajó eds., 2012) (discussing the emphasis on rights in the new 
constitutionalism). 
 35. See Anne-Marie Burley & Walter Mattli, Europe Before the Court: A 
Political Theory of Legal Integration, 47 INT’L ORG. 41, 62–64 (1993) (describing 
the intra-judicial dialogue between the ECJ and national judges, which following 
neo-functionalist analysis enabled them to empower one another). See generally 
ALTER, ESTABLISHING THE SUPREMACY OF EUROPEAN LAW, supra note 12. 
 36. LISA CONANT, JUSTICE CONTAINED: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE EUROPEAN 
UNION (2002); RACHEL A. CICHOWSKI, THE EUROPEAN COURT AND CIVIL 
SOCIETY: LITIGATION, MOBILIZATION AND GOVERNANCE (2007). 
 37. Alter, The Global Spread, supra note 18, at 140; see Karen J. Alter & 
Laurence R. Helfer, Nature or Nurture? Judicial Lawmaking in the European 
Court of Justice and the Andean Tribunal of Justice, 64 INT. ORG. 563, 565 (2010). 
 38. See Geoffrey Garrett et al., The European Court of Justice, National 
Governments, and Legal Integration in the European Union, 52 INT. ORG. 149, 
150, 156–57 (1998) (attributing to the ECJ an important but constrained role in 
enforcing contracts and engaging in dispute resolution). 
 39. See Christian Hunold, Corporatism, Pluralism, and Democracy: Toward a 
Deliberative Theory of Bureaucratic Accountability, 14 GOVERNANCE 151, 152–54 
(2001); Francesca Bignami, From Expert Administration to Accountability 
Network: A New Paradigm for Comparative Administrative Law, 59 AM. J. COMP. 
L. 859, 861 (2001) (proposing an administrative law model that puts accountability 
at the heart of the network). See generally MARK A. POLLACK, THE ENGINES OF 
EUROPEAN INTEGRATION: DELEGATION, AGENCY, AND AGENDA SETTING IN THE 
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much promise, the focus on institutional rules and design or 
attitudinal values to explain legal outcomes has been much more 
prominent in the U.S. context than in the European context.40 While 
such institutional settings provide bargaining situations in which we 
can understand how majorities are constructed or whether specific 
cases are accepted or declined, there has been little work on the role 
of judicial preferences in the European context. Consequently there 
has been limited research on opinion assignment, circulation of 
opinion drafts, bargaining among justices regarding opinion 
language, and so forth, to see how such legal procedures and norms 
impact outcomes. Rasmussen’s challenge has broader implications in 
that studies of the ECJ have not focused on the issue of appointments 
and nominations, which receive far less scrutiny given the range of 
issues that come before the Court’s purview. In addition, both formal 
procedural Chamber rules and informal Court practices matter more 
in crafting the law than scholarship has documented, since the degree 
to which judges concede on an opinion, strategically control the 
breadth of the judgment, or defer to present state of law or legally 
relevant factors, deserves greater attention.41  
In this special issue, Rasmussen offers a new historical 
understanding of EU law that calls for a more sociological approach 
to European law, and a more synthetic, integrative history that 
includes greater attention to legal history to understand the 
historiography of European integration.42 But such a history may 
benefit from moving beyond its single-case focus to think 
 
EU 323 (2003) (noting that delegation can be a sign of credible commitment, may 
prevent policy reversals, and may reduce transaction costs, thereby increasing its 
economic utility). 
 40. See generally JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME 
COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 19, 20–23 (1993) (examining the separation 
of powers model in the United States to support the notion that such delegation and 
deliberative models are more effective in the United States than in Europe). 
 41. See generally Forrest Maltzman, James F. Spriggs II, & Paul J. Wahlbeck, 
Strategy and Judicial Choice: New Institutionalist Approaches to Supreme Court 
Decision-Making, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONAL 
APPROACHES (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999); POLLACK, 
supra note 39. 
 42. See Morten Rasmussen, Rewriting the History of European Public Law: 
The New Contribution of Historians, 28 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1187 (2013). For a 
general overview, see Bill Davies & Morten Rasmussen, Towards a New History 
of European Law, 21 CONTEMP. EUR. HIST. 305 (2012). 
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comparatively in a wider sense about legal method and history. 
Unsurprisingly given their methodological orientation, legal 
historians drawing on sociological approaches have also raised 
important questions about networks, culture, perceptions, rhetoric, 
and the connections between state and civil society.43 Like legal 
realists in the United States, however, many of the pioneers of legal 
integration in Europe are not simply documenting the emergence and 
development of legal doctrines; they view law in context, not as an 
autonomous legal order (despite the language of Van Gend en Loos), 
but as part of the administrative, regulatory, and judicial realm.44 
They are interested in broader patterns of legal action and inaction 
that come from the decisions of administrative agencies as well as 
judge-made law.45 Without neglecting the central role of the judiciary 
in shaping European governance, such legal scholarship has also 
focused on the growth of administrative governance in which the 
diffusion of power to the supranational level generated concerns 
about democratic legitimacy due to the delegation of power to non-
majoritarian institutions whether public or private.46 These scholars 
are raising important substantive and procedural questions about 
constitutional practices where majoritarian principles may be 
undermined by judicial or administrative review.47 By raising 
 
 43. See, e.g., Davies & Rasmussen, supra note 42. 
 44. Andreas Grimmel, Integration and the Context of Law: Why the European 
Court of Justice is not a Political Actor, 3 LES CAHIERS EUROPÉNS DE SCIENCES 
PO, at 6, 21 (2011) (shifting the emphasis from an expansive framework of law 
that focuses on actors and interests toward the social context of 
reasoning and action and to view law as “an independent context of reasoning and 
action”). 
 45. Bignami, supra note 39, at 898 (describing administrative law in the United 
States, Australia, and Britain). 
 46. See Peter Lindseth, Delegation is Dead, Long Live Delegation: Managing 
the Democratic Disconnect in the European Market-Polity, in GOOD GOVERNANCE 
IN EUROPE’S INTEGRATED MARKET 139, 141–43 (Christian Joerges & Renaud 
Dehousse eds., 2002) (finding weakness in new conceptions of democratic and 
constitutional legitimacy through deliberative democracy and non-hierarchical 
institutions because they fail to account for the continued hierarchical modes of 
governance associated with nation states that are still viewed as reflecting the 
demos). 
 47. See Annabelle Lever, Democracy and Judicial Review: Are They Really 
Incompatible?, 7 PERSP. POL. 804, 806–12 (2009) (assessing the compatibility of 
majoritarian principles and judicial review, and noting that despite many critics’ 
opinions supposing judicial review undermines democratic representation, judges 
do not serve a counter-majoritarian role). 
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normative implications about delegation in European governance, it 
reminds us that we also need to understand both the constitutional 
and statutory nature of issues under judicial purview, as the role of 
the court may differ from that of administrative rule-making 
depending on the issue area and policy domain.  
Certainly specialized legal histories are important—as are specific 
policy studies—to enhance our understanding of European 
integration, but they need to embrace bigger causal questions of 
theoretical and historical interest such as the relationship of law to 
contemporary democracy, the rights and conceptions of citizenship, 
the relationship of law to market capitalism, and the issues of 
internationalism, sovereignty, and legal pluralism—all of which have 
been at the forefront in recent high profile legal judgments such as 
Zambrano, Ruffert, Viking, Laval, and Kadi.48 The consequences of 
past actions and political choices in the European legal context are 
monumental for the present as European law has been instrumental 
in both the simultaneous creation of new powers and competences 
and the constitutionalization of new individual rights.49  
European law has “contained” the centrifugal forces in European 
societies and polities by overcoming the fragmentation of multiple 
local jurisdictions and integrating them into a system that enlarges its 
field of economic scrutiny into social welfare activity by regulating 
private power in the public interest, privileging and providing 
selective benefits to citizens and workers, and allowing private 
interests to provide public functions.50 Through, for example, the 
creation of a strong competition regime, the expansion of non-
discrimination provisions for pension portability and equal pay, and 
the delegation of standard setting to private bodies, legal rules have 
shaped market competition. In the context of this larger 
transformation of governance, the contentious politics over the status 
and primacy of law in a federal context is neither unique nor specific 
to Europe. Making a comparative assessment of the relationship 
 
 48. See Stephen Weatherill, The Constitutional Context of (Ever-Wider) 
Policy-Making, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 570, 571–
73 (describing the widening scope of European law). 
 49. Andrew Moravcsik & Andrea Sangiovanni, On Democracy and “Public 
Interest” in the European Union, available at http://www.princeton.edu/ 
~amoravcs/library/scharpf.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2013). 
 50. Id. 
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between legal supremacy and federalism using studies in U.S. legal 
history may shed light on the interactions between the central and 
constituent legal units that provide ways of re-imagining European 
legal integration. In particular, the development of legal jurisdiction, 
the contestation surrounding federal court supremacy and subsequent 
legal reforms, and the issue of social rights and market citizenship in 
the United States provide important reference points for studies of 
European legal developments. The field of American political 
development (“APD”) can provide a fertile environment for scholars 
interested in the study of legal institutional change.  
III. THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT IN 
FEDERAL COURTS 
A quarter-century ago, Stephen Skowronek, in his seminal work, 
recognized the indispensability of a “state of courts” to contain the 
centrifugal forces in American politics.51 Within the historiography 
of American political development there are different 
characterizations of the role of law in shaping the American polity.52 
The judicial role in American governance is worth considering, given 
its promotion and constraint of commercial interests, civil and 
political rights and the propriety of this constitutional independence 
that has often led to constitutionally contentious boundaries between 
federal and state jurisdictions. Just like its European counterpart, the 
Supreme Court has become the constitutional interpreter, but just as 
importantly, it has been contested by different groups, from 
segregationists to pro-life groups.53  
In the United States, the Supreme Court does not merely solve 
disputes between contesting litigants, it authoritatively interprets and 
 
 51. STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE 
EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877–1920 39 (1982). 
 52. Id. See generally Novak, The Legal Origins of the Modern American State, 
supra note 6, at 252 (highlighting different interpretations of the constitutive role 
of law in constituting social regulations, ordered market relations, and public 
welfare); SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST 
APPROACHES (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999) [hereinafter 
SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING]. 
 53. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL 
SUPREMACY 4 (2007) (elaborating on the role of the Supreme Court in terms of 
constitutional construction and interpretation in relation to broader political 
regimes, the politics of constitutional authority, and how it plays out over time). 
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develops constitutional reasoning. This constitutional interpretation 
has to be accepted by other political actors, which is often the source 
of contention against expansive judicial reasoning. At times, there 
has been deference to judicial authority, and in other instances, state 
officials, presidents, and federal executives have challenged the 
Court’s purview.54 In the United States, judicial empowerment has 
generated different interpretations, with legal historians focusing on 
judicial power as a product of legal action derived from judges’ own 
independent choices.55 Whereas political scientists have viewed 
judicial empowerment as contingent on the efforts of legislative and 
executive institutions to fashion a judiciary that serves particular 
partisan interests56 or provides stability and security of outcomes 
under situations of institutional instability and gridlock.57  
However, like the constitutional narrative in the European Union, 
the standard story in the United States is also problematic. The 
attention given to Marbury v. Madison in 1803, where Chief Justice 
John Marshall established the power of judicial review, is misleading 
since the power of judicial review evolved over the course of the 
nineteenth century.58 Although there were sixty cases between 1789 
and 1861 in which the Court evaluated the constitutionality of a 
federal statute, the Court was “laying the foundations for that 
practice and establishing its role as a forum for testing the limits of 
congressional powers.”59 Parties often raised challenges to the 
application of federal law, particularly in the federal district courts 
and circuit courts where cases were often highly controversial, 
touching on slavery, taxation, and bankruptcy provisions.60  
 
 54. Leslie Friedman Goldstein, State Resistance to Authority in Federal 
Unions: The Early United States (1790–1860) and the European Community 
(1958–94), 11 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 149, 157–59 (1997) [hereinafter Goldstein, 
State Resistance]. 
 55. See Gillman, supra note 34, at 512. 
 56. See id. (offering support for the view that judicial empowerment is meant 
to serve certain partisan interests). 
 57. Barry R. Weingast, The Political Foundation of Democracy and the Rule of 
Law, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 245, 246 (1997). 
 58. Keith E. Whittington, Judicial Review of Congress Before the Civil War, 97 
GEO. L.J. 1257, 1285–86 (2009) [hereinafter Whittington, Judicial Review]. 
 59. Id. at 1267. 
 60. See LESLIE FRIEDMAN GOLDSTEIN, CONSTITUTING FEDERAL SOVEREIGNTY: 
THE EUROPEAN UNION IN COMPARATIVE CONTEXT 54–55 (2001) [hereinafter 
GOLDSTEIN, CONSTITUTING FEDERAL SOVEREIGNTY] (demonstrating state 
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The federal courts were regularly called upon to consider the 
legitimate scope of congressional authority and exercise their judicial 
authority to review the validity of legislative and executive action. 
But the Supreme Court largely built its power of judicial review in 
the early decades against recalcitrant states as it struck down many 
local and state policies, and imposed few restrictions on the national 
government until after the Civil War.61 The independence of state 
and local government had been the source of tension, so the judiciary 
was conceived as a means of preserving peace and fostering unity as 
part of a “power constraint” system.62 In an effort to undercut localist 
tendencies, the Marshall Court sought to vest lower courts with 
federal authority, empowering the Court’s jurisdiction in the 
aftermath of the repeal of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1801 when its 
legislative grant of federal jurisdiction was curtailed.63 The goal of 
Marshall and others was to use these “local” federal courts to apply 
“the supreme law of the land” uniformly throughout the localities.64 
Just like the new legal history in Europe, the federal courts were 
embedded in a complex, multi-level system that enhanced the 
jurisdiction of the federal courts through delegation and the right to 
review state laws, both of which were key issues in early debates on 
U.S. federalism.65  
But such judicial empowerment was not inevitable. In nineteenth 
century America, federal district courts, according to Howard 
Gillman, had remarkably limited jurisdiction.66 Hostilities towards 
federal judicial power were not uncommon. Most federal issues were 
 
resistance to federal authority, including the formative early years of the American 
state); Goldstein, State Resistance, supra note 54, at 157–63. 
 61. See Gillman, supra note 34, at 516; Keith E. Whittington, “Interpose Your 
Friendly Hand”: Political Supports for the Exercise of Judicial Review by the 
United States Supreme Court, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 583, 586 (2005); 
Whittington, Judicial Review, supra note 58, at 1308–10. 
 62. See Daniel H. Deudney, The Philadelphian System: Sovereignty, Arms 
Control, and Balance of Power in the American States-Union Circa 1787-1861, 42 
INT. ORG. 191, 202–03 (1995) (explaining that, far from producing anarchy, the 
Philadelphia system was built on union and the mediation of interests, in contrast 
to the European balance-of-powers system). 
 63. Alison L. LaCroix, Federalists, Federalism, and Federal Jurisdiction, 30 
LAW & HIST. REV. 205, 210 (2012). 
 64. Id. at 211. 
 65. Id. at 211–12. 
 66. Gillman, supra note 34, at 513. 
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heard in state courts where there was often resistance to the higher 
court in the first several decades over a range of issues.67 The 
Supreme Court also faced strong sectional interests, and was unable 
to leverage its role in shaping federal policies, as vested interests 
sharply curtailed its competences.68 Efforts to enhance the federal 
judiciary were rejected until after the Civil War. Federal judicial 
districts and circuits were tied to state boundaries, no circuit 
contained both a free and a slave state to ensure the protection of 
Southern regional interests, and while riding circuit, federal judges 
were required to include the local federal judge who made the 
original decision in the subsequent appeals process.69 For Gillman, 
local and regional considerations remained paramount, thus 
preventing the creation of a national judiciary.70 
The creation of a more effective national judicial system owed 
much to the pressure from Northern financial and commercial 
interests that sought to improve the efficiency of the federal 
judiciary.71 While there were some calls from judges, lawyers, and 
newspapers to increase the number of district courts and eliminate 
circuit riding by justices, the subsequent legislative reforms 
expanded the federal role of courts, redirected civil litigation 
involving national commercial interests out of state courts, and 
resulted in a more active role for federal courts in confronting the 
new corporate and financial practices.72 The result was a federal 
judiciary that invoked the Commerce Clause with unprecedented 
frequency and interpreted it to require courts to eliminate barriers to 
the free flow of interstate goods and services. However, such 
involvement generated a significant increase in case load, with rising 
 
 67. See GOLDSTEIN, CONSTITUTING FEDERAL SOVEREIGNTY, supra note 60, at 
64; see also Goldstein, State Resistance, supra note 54, at 157–59. 
 68. See RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AMERICAN 
INDUSTRIALIZATION, 1877-1900 518 (2000) (expounding on the judicial 
construction of a national market). 
 69. Gillman, supra note 34, at 514. 
 70. See id. at 516 (quoting Keller (citation omitted)) (“Public life in the years 
immediately after the Civil War was dominated by the conflict between the 
impulse to foster an active state and a broader national citizenship on the one hand, 
and deeply rooted countervalues of localism, racism and suspicion of government 
on the other . . . .”). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 515. 
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rates of litigation on the appellate, circuit, and district dockets.73  
The subsequent restructuring of the federal judiciary through 
Congressional action in the 1870s was not uncontested. Partisan 
politics played a significant role in judicial empowerment as 
prevailing debates between Republican and Democratic politics over 
economic regulation shaped jurisdiction and constitutional 
practices.74 The federal context provided the opportunity for the 
Supreme Court to promote national supremacy, resolve interstate 
disputes and contribute to the process of state building through 
striking down legislative barriers that undermined the consolidation 
of the national market.75 However, the result was to remove 
localizing pressures and expand the powers and responsibilities of 
the federal judiciary as part of a broader enhancement of federal 
capacity and administration in the late nineteenth century. The rise of 
the jural state76 corresponded with the rise of the administrative 
regulatory state in the United States as the need for greater 
administrative capacity to deal with the growth of large-scale 
enterprises and new commercial and financial practices generated 
new responsibilities for non-majoritarian institutions.77 Under the 
guise of jurisdictional and procedural reforms, as part of a larger 
process of delegated powers to public agencies dealing with issues 
arising from industrialism, the political construction of judicial 
power advanced throughout the nineteenth century. 
As major economic transformations took place in the United 
States, the corresponding social changes also fostered important legal 
 
 73. Id. at 519–20. 
 74. See BENSEL, supra note 68, at 502–03 (highlighting examples of the deeply 
partisan debates in 1890 over the McKinley Tariff Act and the Sherman Silver 
Purchase Act). 
 75. See id. at 516–17 (“[W]hile rhetorically acknowledging the possible need 
for restraints on market expansion, the Republicans turned most of the 
implementation of laissez-fair principles over to Republican judges on the 
Supreme Court who, well insulated from popular influence, could turn back state 
and local attempts to Balkanize the national market.”); accord Gillman, supra note 
34, at 519 (“[T]he overall record demonstrates that conservative Supreme Court 
justices were quite willing to support Congress’s efforts to expand the control of 
federal courts over commercial litigation.”) . 
 76. William J. Novak, The Myth of the “Weak” American State, 113 AM. HIST. 
REV. 767 (2008) [hereinafter Novak, Myth of the “Weak” American State]. 
 77. See generally Novak, The Legal Origins of the Modern American State, 
supra note 6, at 249–83. 
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debates about the scope of citizenship, individual rights and political 
inclusion, and the role of the state in regulating social and economic 
life.78 While courts grappled with issues of public goods and private 
rights from the early days of the republic, the predominant view was 
to characterize the American law “[a]s something of a conservative 
roadblock to liberal reform—part of a reactionary and exceptional 
American juridical tradition that continually frustrates the 
development of a proper American welfare state” and restricts its 
“[c]ommitment to civil rights.”79 This narrative misses the substantial 
role of the police powers that, in the nineteenth century, 
encompassed a range of social policies that provided for “the 
people’s welfare.”80 The broad legal definition of police power was 
upheld by the Supreme Court, which invalidated state laws when 
they were related to class legislation, providing preferential treatment 
to specific groups. However, states and localities enacted thousands 
of public laws protecting welfare, securing social order, and 
employing regulatory powers of government.81 The new legal history 
of American private law, according to William Novak, challenges 
the dominant narrative of law as a protector of private liberty, 
property rights, and a “jurisprudential commitment” to private rights 
over public goods.82 The resulting “new social legislation” or 
“industrial legislation” generated a host of statutory measures that 
amounted to what Majone describes in the European context as 
social regulation rather than social welfare.83 While the response to 
industrialism produced a national police power through the creative 
exercise of commerce, taxing, spending, and postal powers, the 
provision of public goods and public services highlights the changes 
that took place in American governance.  
 
 78. See William J. Novak, The Legal Transformation of Citizenship in 
Nineteenth-Century America, in THE DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENT: NEW DIRECTIONS 
IN AMERICAN POLITICAL HISTORY (Meg Jacobs et al. eds., 2003) [hereinafter 
Novak, Legal Transformation of Citizenship]. 
 79. Novak, Myth of the “Weak” American State, supra note 76, at 767. 
 80. Novak, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE, supra note 77, at 21. 
 81. Id. (including “regulation of dangerous buildings; railways and public 
conveyances; corporations; the use of streets, highways, wharves and docks . . . .”). 
 82. Id. at 23. The U.S. term “affected with a public interest” should be familiar 
to Europeans in terms of “service publique.” 
 83. Giandomenico Majone, The European Community Between Social Policy 
and Social Regulation, 31 J. COM. MKT. STUD. 153, 156 (1993). 
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Novak also argues that there was a further “constitutionalization of 
rights” in the United States, but this was not uniform and universal in 
much the same way that European legal jurisprudence initially 
focused on market citizenship, social rights, boundaries, and benefits 
for European citizens.84 American citizenship in the nineteenth 
century was also based on a hierarchy of rights.85 Sharp restrictions 
were imposed by gender, race, and ethnicity in terms of mobility, 
freedom, and property rights. Like EU citizenship that was only 
formalized in the Maastricht Treaty in 1993, American citizenship as 
a concept was not central to constitutional debates; instead it was 
applied as a jurisdictional, rather than a rights issue.86 States were 
thus able to discriminate against non-residents in numerous ways, 
such as in debtor-creditor relations, marketing, or corporate 
privileges.87 As Novak concludes, in the nineteenth century, 
“[i]ndividual rights and obligations remained the products of local 
governments and courts elaborating highly differentiated common-
law rules of status, membership and association.”88 The sudden 
emergence of citizenship as an issue came after the Civil War driven 
by the Fourteenth Amendment. The conflict about who was a citizen 
of the United States brought to the forefront the right of free blacks 
and the application of the privileges and immunities clause of 
Fourteenth Amendment, which generated broad debates about rights 
 
 84. Compare Novak, Legal Transformation of Citizenship, supra note 78, at 94 
(arguing that the Bill of Rights did not begin as a “top-down constitutional 
enumeration of the rights and responsibilities of citizens of a new nation-state, but 
with a bottom-up common law tradition in which citizenship was considered the 
last form of membership in a continuum of public jurisdictions and civil 
associations”), with Maurizio Ferrara THE BOUNDARIES OF WELFARE: EUROPEAN 
INTEGRATION AND THE NEW SPATIAL POLITICS OF SOCIAL PROTECTION 167 (2005) 
(discussing obstacles to social protection in Europe, and noting that “federalism 
delayed welfare state formation in the North American context, in both Canada and 
the USA”). 
 85. Novak, Legal Transformation of Citizenship, supra note 78, at 95. 
 86. Id. at 97 (describing the early concept of citizenship as based on 
membership to particular groups rather than an individual right). 
 87. See, e.g., Charles W. McCurdy, American Law and the Marketing Structure 
of the Large Corporation, 1875–1890, 38 J. ECON. HIST. 631, 641 (1978) 
(describing efforts by commercial enterprises to overcome interstate barriers in 
response to changing structure and operation of business enterprises, as out-of-
state manufactures could not sell directly to non-wholesalers within the state, and 
out-of-state salesmen had to pay licensing fees to the state for the privilege of 
conducting business). 
 88. Novak, Legal Transformation of Citizenship, supra note 78, at 92. 
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in the post-Civil War period.89 The federal government would come 
to guarantee those rights based around the concept of national 
citizenship. Though expanded to include previously marginalized 
groups, debates continued into the twentieth century through the civil 
rights and other social movements, as rights became the purview of 
national jurisdictions at the expense of local and state authority. This 
is something that we should not be surprised to see in the European 
context, as the effects of integration bring to the forefront the impact 
of differentiated treatment of citizens, non-residents, and the strains 
between boundaries, citizenship, and non-discrimination.90  
Taken together, these developments bear a strong resemblance to 
the legal developments in Europe. Initially, the preliminary review 
process did not bestow significant power upon judges. The ECJ was 
limited to reviewing issues related to EU law and so Member States 
saw it as a body to safeguard EU law rather than an institution 
actively involved in European integration. The ECJ also had few 
cases to consider in the early period, from around a dozen cases per 
year on average during the 1960s to more than two hundred cases per 
year since the early 1990s.91 While the ECJ provided an opportunity 
for private litigants to “forum shop,” whether litigants were able to 
achieve more favorable outcomes depended on rules of access, 
acceptance of referral, and other factors. In the United States, 
businesses were eager to move their disputes to federal courts. This 
was due to the emergence of separate federal and state legal systems 
to deal with local affairs, resulting in difficulties for those operating 
interstate businesses, so they sought “sympathetic courthouses” 
amidst a multiplicity of rules and institutional fragmentation in the 
search for order.92 Above all, courts contributed to the process of 
market building where a “well-regulated society”93 emerged in which 
 
 89. See Philip Hamburger, Privileges or Immunities, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 61, 
74–83 (2011) (explaining that the initial debates on privileges and immunities 
centered around mobility, comity and cross-border travel, and later focused on to 
whom those rights extended). 
 90. See Ferrara, supra note 84, at 167. 
 91. COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, STATISTICS CONCERNING  
THE JUDICIAL ACTIVITY OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE 115–16 (2012), available  
at http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2012-06/ra2011_ 
statistiques_cour_en.pdf. 
 92. Gillman, supra note 34, at 519. 
 93. Novak, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE, supra note 77, at 21. 
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there was an expansion of police and regulatory power in the United 
States that corresponds to the rise of the regulatory state in Europe. 
In both cases, law was a forceful source of expansive public 
authority and governance, as it simultaneously dealt with market 
externalities, promotion of public services, and private rights. This 
reflects the socially embedded nature of capitalism, and the 
important role of the public interest in the construction and 
regulation of the market. The developments in Europe and the United 
States were overwhelmingly legal in nature, as the promotion of 
market integration in labor, consumption and commerce, expansion 
of new economic and social rights (for some), and the contestation 
for power between competing political-economic jurisdictions was 
anything but settled.  
IV. NEW WINE IN OLD BOTTLES 
Of particular interest in this special issue are the varied sources of 
ideas and pressures for change, both internal and external, to the 
judicial and legal system. In both the European and American case, 
we see that law can be innovative with major changes fostering a 
“rights consciousness” that can generate substantial litigation for 
addressing economic discrimination, social protection, and 
democracy promotion. On the one hand, law can foster doctrinal 
changes and legal remedies to deal with the increasing complexity of 
society. Then again, law is neither fixed nor immutable, but rather, 
part of a broader system of governance, which is flexible in terms of 
its jurisdictional authority and scope. 
While Rasmussen provides a more nuanced view of the role of law 
in fostering and strengthening European integration through detailed 
historical analysis, the legal practices observed are unsurprising in a 
federal-type system. While pointing to the challenges from deep-
seated national legal traditions to the creation of a European legal 
order, the important question is whether these structural constraints 
identified by legal historians are unique to the European Union. In 
many federal systems, each level of government has a 
“constitutionally grounded claim to some degree of organizational 
autonomy and jurisdictional authority”94 that is a product of a 
 
 94. Daniel Halberstam, Comparative Federalism and the Role of the Judiciary, 
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW AND POLITICS 142 (Keith E. Whittington et al. 
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constitutional bargain.95 While central courts seek to promote legal 
uniformity within the federation, the degree to which they can ensure 
uniformity varies as well.96  
Despite the inclusion of constituent units to administer, 
implement, and transpose federal policies into constituent state laws, 
the preliminary ruling system in Europe does not guarantee 
uniformity of judicial norms and practices. For example, the 
presumption of constitutionality is interpreted in different ways: 
some constitutions, without formally adopting the claim, incorporate 
the supremacy claim of European law, and others provide supremacy 
to their own constitutional claims over that of European law.97 Even 
in the United States, there are conflicting interpretations of federal 
law among circuit courts, as well as a history of state resistance to 
the Supreme Court in the early foundational period of the American 
republic. Though many scholars point to the Marbury v. Madison 
ruling as the expression of judicial authority, the Court repudiated it 
shortly afterwards in Stuart v. Laird.98 In this instance, the Supreme 
Court refused to undermine Congressional authority.99 We might 
conclude that courts were fully aware of the potential consequences 
of acting out of step with majoritarian institutions, thus they may 
refrain from expansive interpretations of judicial review.  
While providing an important corrective, the history of European 
 
eds., 2008). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Daniel Halberstam & Mathaias Reimann, Federalism and Legal 
Unifications: Comparing Methods, Results, and Explanations Across 20 Systems 
11–12 (Univ. Mich. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, 
Paper No. 186, 2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1557690 (outlining 
various mechanisms which courts employ to attempt uniformity). 
 97. Miguel Poiares Maduro, Three Claims of Constitutional Pluralism 12–13, 
available at http://www.wzb.eu/sites/default/files/u32/miguel_maduro_three_ 
claims_of_constitutional_pluralism_hu-coll_may_15_2012.pdf (last visited Mar. 
19, 2013). 
 98. See Daniel Halberstam, Constitutionalism and Pluralism in Marbury and 
Van Gend 3 (Univ. Mich. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper 
Series, Paper No. 104, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1103253 
[hereinafter Halberstam, Constitutionalism and Pluralism in Marbury] (noting that 
Chief Justice Marshall polled fellow judges before the Stuart case and did not find 
enough support, resulting in a judgment in which he sought a recusal, leading the 
Court to uphold the constitutionality of the repeal of the Judiciary Act, thus 
acknowledging the political reality that Federalist circuit judges could be purged). 
 99. Id. 
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law needs to be linked to broader comparative studies of federalism 
where constitutional orders have been constructed and 
transformed.100 The legitimating strategy promoted by the ECJ, along 
with support from the legal academy, is neither unique nor unusual, 
despite the efforts of legal historians to revise the conventional 
understanding of the narrative in Europe. There is a continuing 
debate about the appropriate role of courts in the American 
constitutional order.101 Here we see clearly some parallels with 
European debates. American constitutional history has produced a 
strong narrative about the rule of law and constitutionalism that 
parallels the deeply ingrained narrative of the ECJ and its role in the 
integration process. According to Novak, progressive historians in 
raising concerns about compliance with judicial decisions have 
“focus[ed] on three great constitutional moments (1787, 1868, and 
1937) . . . [resulting in the origins] of constitutional review, the 
content of constitutional rights, and Lochnerism and its New Deal 
repudiation”102 to explain the constitutional limitations that hindered 
the expansive welfare state regimes prevalent in European states. 
These critical junctures show how law suppressed labor rights, 
promoted liberty of contract, and curbed state and local government 
spending and tax power until the New Deal era.103  
Consequently, this predominantly “negative legalism”104 views 
law as undermining social democracy, providing a constitutional 
barrier to the development of a modern regulatory and administrative 
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welfare state, in similar ways to those who perceive the 
constitutional asymmetry in the European Union as undermining 
social rights and welfare.105 In the United States this is often viewed 
as “residuum of a nineteenth-century jurisprudential tradition of 
natural law and individual rights out-of-step with the needs of a 
modern economy.”106 In Europe, the path to market integration also 
faces legal and constitutional irregularities where selective 
Europeanization results in eviscerating social programs, since 
European law “would take precedence over all rules and practices 
based on national law . . . all employment and welfare-state polices 
at the national level had to be designed in the shadow of 
‘constitutionalized’ European law.”107 Thus, “the governance 
challenge within Europe remains the resolution of conflict within the 
Internal Market” along with the need to address its regulatory and 
redistributive problems.108  
Rather than see a jurisprudential tradition as hostile to rights and 
redistribution, a more positive (as opposed to negative) role of law in 
the construction of a central regulatory welfare state has emerged 
that challenges the progressive historiography in the United States.109 
Rather than a critique of law, this approach views markets as socially 
embedded through the expansion of state and federal police power to 
deal with social dislocation, modernization, and industrialization, 
with law playing a much more socio-progressive role in economic 
policymaking.110 Such “embedded liberalism” is also viewed as 
emerging through judicial intervention in Europe where the ECJ has 
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shown a willingness to promote social rights, using market freedoms 
and fundamental rights to promote access to collective goods for 
European nationals, whether in terms of professions, education, 
justice, or national systems of social protection.111 As such, there are 
some important parallels between their respective political 
developments in terms of the politics of rights. 
Equally important, legal historians have focused attention on the 
personal preferences and professional ethos surrounding the 
constitutionalization of European law.112 While identifying key actors 
and organizations that contributed to the development of the 
European system, such strategic legal mobilization is not unique to 
the European case. Legal historian Harry Scheiber notes, “Since the 
Progressive era, some ninety years ago, the leadership of the 
organized bar and the judiciary have pursued the agenda of what is 
called ‘judicial reform’—with the support of various political 
leaders, legal academics and scholars in the field of court 
administration, and reform groups dedicated to upgrading 
governmental institutions.”113 As Charles McCurdy has argued in his 
influential work on nineteenth century commercial practices, 
“skillful counsel” within large corporations took action against 
restrictive state laws and pushed for new juridical principles to 
preserve free trade among the states.114 In challenging the legitimacy 
of protectionist state legislation, litigants with sufficient resources 
advanced lawsuits to combat state governments’ efforts to mobilize 
“counterthrusts” against the Supreme Court’s nationalistic doctrines, 
115 in arguments that bear a strong resemblance to judicial scholars 
focusing on the strategic mobilization of specific legal constituencies 
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in the European Community context.116  
In addition, the role of policy preferences on judicial outcomes has 
been widely recognized in studies of the U.S. Supreme Court.117 
Much of this behavioral research focused on how the justices’ 
attitudes and values shaped their votes on a case, since the Supreme 
Court’s institutional features of lifetime tenure, dissenting opinions, 
and coalition building, shape their ability to vote their policy 
preferences.118 Such an argument is now emerging in legal history 
research on the role of European judges in terms of how individual 
preferences shape court behavior and outcomes.119 Further research 
on voting patterns in the ECJ could contribute significantly to an 
understanding of the role of attitudinal factors in forecasting judicial 
outcomes based on aggregating the preferences of judges. 
However, legal historians have also pointed to the institutional 
constraints imposed by other political actors, including national 
governments, courts, and administrators, in shaping the development 
of the European legal system.120 This suggests that judges take 
account of the constraints they may encounter and understand the 
consequences of their own action in introducing their policy 
preferences into law.121 These constraints can take the form of formal 
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rules or informal norms, where internal rules of procedure about the 
use of judicial panels, assignment of Advocates General to specific 
cases, assignment of specific opinions to judges, as well as norms of 
consensus and use of precedent can impact judicial behavior. As 
such, the story told by legal historians about the strategic interactions 
between the judicial, executive, and administrative branches at the 
national and European level are not dissimilar to the exogenous and 
endogenous constraints emerging from the American federal court 
system. Yet we know remarkably less about the strategic behavior of 
justices—at the national and European levels—within existing 
institutional constraints.122 It is possible that the discursive practices, 
legal reasoning, and legal remedies to accommodate the justices’ 
respective legal claims to supremacy are aimed at avoiding frequent 
and divisive constitutional conflicts.123 The well-known example of 
the fundamental rights jurisprudence of the ECJ illustrates its ability 
to acknowledge the importance of human rights practices in national 
constitutions.124  
By focusing on political processes in which legal decisions are 
made rather than on final case law opinions, the new legal history 
highlights the importance of coalition formation and opinion-writing 
on the Court as key explanations for emergence of constitutional 
practices and legal precedents in the European Union. As a result, 
legal historians are developing a much richer understanding of the 
political, strategic nature of judicial decision-making in the formative 
period of integration.125 But judicial review and the norms of direct 
effect and supremacy that derived from such legal reasoning are not 
formal provisions established by conscious institutional design and 
treaty bargains. They are the product of political willingness to 
 
taken by other judges. Justices engage in strategic behavior that can be used to 
model judicial behavior and outcomes, allowing for changing preferences in the 
course of decision-making, from opinion writing through joining the majority). 
 122. But see Carrubba, supra note 119, at 449. 
 123. See Burley & Mattli, supra note 35, at 41–42 (noting the importance of 
doctrinal discourse that allows legal reasoning to “mask” the implications of its 
rulings, affording it strong protection against national governments’ opposition). 
 124. See Weiler & Lockhart, Taking Rights Seriously, supra note 11, at 61 
(noting Rutili, Cinéthèque, and Klensch as landmark decisions of the ECJ applying 
its fundamental rights jurisprudence to national constitutions). 
 125. See, e.g., Boerger-de Smedt, supra note 19 (discussing early negotiations in 
treaties). 
  
2013] TOWARD A NEW HISTORY IN EUROPEAN LAW 1251 
accept such norms. Legal historians have sought to explain what 
caused the commitment to reviewing the constitutionality of both 
European and national statutes by courts through archival research. 
However, we might theorize about the broader implications of such 
inter-institutional politics by using a framework drawn from rational 
choice to understand the political and strategic preferences of 
different actors, the political context in which the dispute takes place, 
and the strategic behavior of jurists.126  
Equally important are the implications of vesting federal 
supremacy through judicial mechanisms, rather than legislative 
processes, meaning that the European Community chose to deal with 
the inevitable friction between levels of government in a federal 
system in much the same way as the Americans in their founding 
document. Choosing judicial supremacy has resulted in resistance.127 
In highlighting concerns about compliance with judicial decisions, 
scholars have raised an issue of both empirical and theoretical 
importance. Compliance with laws, treaties, and statutes is critical 
for democracy, yet it has often been assumed that adherence to 
judicial decisions and rulings are routine in advanced industrial 
democracies. When judicial rulings call on multiple governments to 
act, they may do so to different degrees and understandings. This 
complex issue of compliance, supremacy, independence, and power 
in relation to courts also suggests that understanding what drove 
legal integration in Europe can generate multiple causation and 
inferential challenges. Ideas about what factors influenced European 
legal developments may be helped by counterfactuals in testing new 
historical arguments: What if European Member States had reversed 
court rulings, either through treaty amendment or legislative action? 
How different would the Community look if they had taken the 
Madison path and opted for broad legislative oversight and negative 
vetoes over state legislation by a federal legislature or 
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government?128 Would there have been more resistance to the 
supremacy doctrine? What might be the implications if supremacy 
was vested in other institutions rather than the Court?  
V. CONCLUSION 
Bridging the disparate approaches to the study of European law is 
difficult given different theoretical and empirical orientations in 
European integration. While legal historians have pointed to the 
contradictory efforts of promotion and resistance to European 
constitutionalism within Member States, they have offered more 
nuanced understandings of key legal opinions. In so doing, they open 
up new avenues for research that can provide a richer historical 
context about the strategic nature of European- and national-level 
judicial policy-making. Building upon this research, we can further 
theorize about the agenda-setting role of specific national courts, the 
dynamic political process in which legal decisions are made, and the 
changing of preferences in the course of legal decision-making based 
on more detailed empirical data. Though initially conceived of as an 
international organization, the ECJ is like a federal court, which 
brings possibilities of further comparisons with other federal 
systems.129 While one recent direction has been to focus on the ECJ 
in terms of judicial emulation and diffusion to other regional 
courts,130 the other direction is to think about the historical parallels 
where the intersection of national law with federal constitutional law 
in Europe can generate comparisons with the American experience 
where local common law was displaced by federal constitutional law 
in the post-Civil War period with corresponding legal mobilization 
and resistance, and concerns about the balance between enumerated 
rights, state autonomy, and constitutional tolerance.131 In the United 
States, the role of law contributed to the growth of the modern 
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regulatory state and the growth of constitutional individual rights that 
are among the most important changes in American governance in 
the nineteenth century.  
Interestingly, what emerged was a “veritable cult of 
constitutionalism” in the late nineteenth century, where a variety of 
local and state laws came under the purview of the U.S. Supreme 
Court, which defined the boundaries between public and private as 
well as state and federal power.132 Miguel Poiares Maduro has 
pointed to a similar development in the ECJ.133 Rasmussen has 
sought to challenge the classical historical narrative of a progressive 
process of “constitutionalization” in ways that are reminiscent of 
American legal historians who challenge the dominant paradigm 
widely accepted by progressive constitutional historiography and 
critical legal studies that the expansion of individual rights and 
governmental power that characterized the modern liberal state is a 
New Deal phenomenon. Constitutional practices were as unsettled in 
nineteenth and twentieth century America as they were in post-war 
Europe. Constitutional doctrines and statutory practices emerged to 
deal with the changes in production and consumption and rights and 
citizenship throughout the nineteenth century.134 What emerges from 
this comparison is the creative and constitutive role of law in 
balancing market liberalism and social welfare, individual rights 
against collective public goods, and promoting national and 
international commerce through regulating the conditions for 
economic growth, competitiveness, and development.135  
Together the changes made by law contributed to a tremendous 
restructuring of American and European political economies and 
democratic governance—arguably significant transformations that 
deserve consideration in their own right. American law responded to 
the changes of industrialism by expanding rights through a paradigm 
of national citizenship, along with democratic legal control over 
markets. Though by no means mitigating conflict or fully 
recognizing individual identities, many difficult constitutional 
questions confronted the U.S. Supreme Court as it sought to exercise 
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its jurisprudence. As Europe continues to be in turmoil with 
considerable protest about the integration project, legal historians are 
contributing to the debate about democratic legitimacy by studying 
the framework in which such Court-expansionist cases were decided. 
In doing so, they are implicitly raising questions about the counter-
majoritarian tendencies of the European Union and the relationship 
of law to the empirical and normative development of political 
union. Rasmussen suggests that “we need a very broad understanding 
of the actors and societal forces that shaped the development of 
European public law.”136 Legal historians are shedding light on the 
early development of the ECJ, adding their own intellectual and 
methodological contributions to our understanding of courts and 
politics, leading us to ask how their historical contextualization 
changes the way we understand legal decision-making and legal 
change.  
Although acknowledging their contributions, my aim has been to 
utilize the insights of American Political Development (“APD”) so 
that the ongoing reassessment of the role of law in both federal 
systems suggests new understandings and directions for research for 
scholars of European integration. American political development is 
distinguished by its engagement with the past through empirical 
rigor, its challenge to path dependency, through systematic 
consideration of temporality, and its emphasis on conceptualizing 
historical processes of change. APD scholarship has contributed to a 
broader understanding of judicial activism that challenges the 
behavioral approach to judicial policy-making as well as the more 
normative work on justice and the law.137 To some degree, EU legal 
historians are going down the same path. Though the substantive 
focus of APD is on the American system, it is contributing to the 
historical turn in political science by “unraveling the teleological 
assumptions” of earlier studies and reexamining traditional themes.138 
APD scholarship stresses institutional change that may be 
endogenously generated by frictions and “incurrence” between 
multiple political orders and traditions, or exogenously driven by 
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their interaction with other institutions.139  
As such, APD scholars have shown that the American judiciary 
has played a strong role in the creation of a national economy, 
advancing certain individual rights at the expense of others, and 
constituting national citizenship.140 Not only does the 
institutionalization of specific legal practices occur, but it also 
provokes contestation and change. Equally relevant, APD scholars 
have focused on the structural weakness of other institutions—
namely legislative and executive—to understand why other actors 
and institutions assert or assent to such legal activism.141 This 
accords with Weiler’s seminal argument that portrays “integration 
through law” as a rational response to a changing political 
environment.142 Arguably, legal historians need to explore the 
consequences of legal changes for state development, authority, and 
power, and they need to elaborate upon how jurisprudence and the 
interplay of ideas, institutions, and ideological agendas generate 
different political logics that can result in contradictions and 
dysfunctional outcomes. This will enable legal historians to broaden 
their paradigmatic and substantive questions to engage not only the 
fields of European integration specifically, but international law, 
international relations, and comparative politics more broadly.143  
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